You could say that it is a fact that the earth attracts stuff when you drop it. Science would call that a fact, but only because it has been corroborated so many times.
But in actuality it is a general statement that is applied to all objects on the earth. And since we have not tested all objects on the earth to see if they fall, even that claim is a hypothesis. Consider that 1000 years ago, it would have been considered a fact that heavy objects fell faster than lighter objects. It seemed self-evident, obvious, and reasonable. It just happened to be wrong.
Actually (as I'm sure you will grant), things are even more complicated than that.
Now I don't know if it was considered
self-evident that heavy bodies fall faster than light ones, i.e., evident from the mere proposition itself, but it was certainly considered
evident, i.e., confirmed by universal experience; and, I would say, with perfectly good reason. To say that that belief was "wrong," however, is a potentially misleading simplification. It makes it sound as though physicists--or "natural philosophers," as they were called then--changed their minds about the value of the answer to a single, unambiguous question: "Do heavy bodies fall faster than light ones?" In fact, the change between, say, 1600 and 1700 in what a natural philosopher might have said in answer to such a question reflects a change in the entire theoretical framework of mechanics. In particular, the whole way of thinking of what constitutes motion, and especially uniform motion, underwent a change. The answer to the question changes only when the meaning of the question changes.
To illustrate: Suppose that you could travel back to 1500, say (before Galileo starting making trouble for the Aristotelian natural philosophy), and build a vacuum chamber capacious enough to let you drop two bodies of vastly disparate weights in it, such as a scrap of paper and a pebble. I don't know if any natural philosopher of that day would have accepted the idea of a "vacuum" (as late as the 17th century, many held the idea to be a contradiction in terms), but presumably you could get one to accept that the air in the chamber had been made extremely thin. Now imagine that you demonstrate to your man that the scrap of paper and the pebble fall at the same rate. He acknowledges this fact, and even grants you that if you could build a large enough version of such a chamber, you could make a feather and a cannonball fall at the same rate.
"Well, then," you say to him, "don't you see that this shows that the rate at which bodies fall does not vary with their weight?"
He laughs out loud and looks at you as if trying to decide whether you are a charlatan or an idiot. "Let me get this straight," he says (or whatever is the Latin equivalent of that). "You build a device that creates conditions so unnatural that a feather and a cannonball fall at the same rate; and you take this to prove that a feather and a cannonball
always fall at the same rate?"
"No, no," you say to him; "I just mean that their rate of fall is the same under ideal conditions, when all extraneous factors, such as air resistance, are absent."
He stops laughing and wrinkles his brow, as if suspecting that you are in the grip of some sort of madness. "You consider the resistance of air to the motion of bodies through it an
extraneous factor? Surely it is the natural condition of motion toward the earth. How can you deny that it is the thinning out of air by this curious apparatus that is the extraneous factor? For heaven's sake, where have such conditions ever been observed in nature?!"
For a moment you consider telling him about the motion of bodies through space far above the surface of the earth, but if you are wise, you give up the task as virtually impossible. To persuade him that the rate of fall of bodies is independent of their weight, you would have to change his conception of a whole wealth of phenomena.
My point, which I take to be in agreement with your position, is that the contrast between "fact" and "theory," while it can be illuminating in some instances of scientific research, can be difficult or impossible to apply without conceptual confusion in other instances. Certainly the idea of a fixed and global distinction between one part of science that is "fact" and another that is "theory" is untenable.