I'm not sure this is entirely true, man. "Intention" is very hard to quantify or calculate. It's nearly impossible to measure, in other words. Often times we humans rationalize our intentions based upon societal decrees even before our full mind has had a chance to process the information. I think we have to look higher, to "what does this behavior *mean*" not just "what does this behavior mean to US." =)
Actually, on this point I think Invisible is entirely correct. Intention is an indispensable concept for the understanding of human action. The capacity for intentional action, to have goals or ends to which we direct our actions purposefully, is crucially a part of what makes us human, rather than mere automatons. How are we to describe the action of giving a gift, for instance, if not for the identification of an intention to give? Without that intention, the action must be descirbed in an external and behavioural fashion as the mere transferance of an object from one hand to another.
The fact that an intention cannot be measured (assuming it cannot) in no way means it cannot be recognised as existing - we act in response to other people's intentions all the time; I notice or infer that someone's action indicates an intention to hit me in the face, and I promptly get out of the way. Courts of law constantly make judgments which rely on the assertainment of the intentional element necessary for the committal of a crime (did the accused intend to kill, or merely wound, the deceased victim? If the latter, than the accused may have committed manslaughter, but if the former than he has committed murder).
I think, in your final point, that you are conflating subjectivity or subjective attestation with intention. You are right to point out the fact that just because someone attests that he did so-and-so with such and such an intention, or for such-and-such a reason, it does not follow that
in fact he did so-and-so with the intention or for the reason he adduces. Subjective attestation is not conclusive though often it will be persuasive. It is true that many people will rationalise their motivations or intentions deceptively so as to cause their actions to be viewed in comformity to what is expected of them. But this simply demonstrates that a rationalisation will not count as a
cause of their actions, but rather as an
obfuscation of the true cause of their actions (one that is, by the way, generally
intended to obfuscate, though I concede that there are surely unconscious rationalisations adduced as reasons as well). It does not show that a real intention is not identifiable
objectively inspite of the rationalisation. So by emphasising that "intention" should be the focus of the inquiry, Invisible is not committed to the proposition that the meaning of my action is to be
conclusively ascertained by reference to what it "means to me".
Thanks for the compliment in your reply to my first post, by the way! Very flattered though I can't claim to be the kind of professional that you speculate I might be. Just a law student whose first degree was in literature. I think you can learn a lot about the analysis of human action and emotion from closely reading literature.