I think you have some persuasive points, rawrs. There does seem to have been an an ambitious geo-political strategy animating the decision to declare war on, invade and subsequently occupy Iraq. This strategy, involving a perhaps utopian plan to use Iraq as a catalyst from which to effect political change in the middle-east favourable to United States (and western) interests, wasn't explicity articulated as a justification for the war, but an investigation of neo-conservative ideology (and the influence that these ideologues had, perhaps still have, on the foreign policy thinking of the Administration) discloses a powerful if subterranean fascination with the idea.
But why would a parallel ambition to secure a significant long-term supply of a precious energy resource, the crucial nature of which is becoming more and more apparent with the rapid industrialisation of China and the corrosive corruption in Saudi Arabia, which corrosion threatens to disrupt the cosy relationship the US has with that later country, be inconsistent with pursuing a more "enlightened" strategy? Couldn't both motivations cohere? Burns surely has persuasive points as well: I don't think we should assume that there was only one reason for going to war. Even if the geo-political strategy was the major reason, there is every further reason to believe that economic interests, and companies like Haliburton etc, would never give up an opportunity to take advantage of the massive profits to be made as a result of the war. In fact, the administration has presented Haliburton with this opportunity; it has at least positively acquiesced in the present situation where United States interests control Iraqi resources.
But why would a parallel ambition to secure a significant long-term supply of a precious energy resource, the crucial nature of which is becoming more and more apparent with the rapid industrialisation of China and the corrosive corruption in Saudi Arabia, which corrosion threatens to disrupt the cosy relationship the US has with that later country, be inconsistent with pursuing a more "enlightened" strategy? Couldn't both motivations cohere? Burns surely has persuasive points as well: I don't think we should assume that there was only one reason for going to war. Even if the geo-political strategy was the major reason, there is every further reason to believe that economic interests, and companies like Haliburton etc, would never give up an opportunity to take advantage of the massive profits to be made as a result of the war. In fact, the administration has presented Haliburton with this opportunity; it has at least positively acquiesced in the present situation where United States interests control Iraqi resources.